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Abstract
Social Media are evolving as a pervasive source of news able to reach a larger audience
through their spreading power. The main drawback is given by the presence of malicious
accounts, known as social bots, which are often used to diffuse misleading information.
Social bots are automated accounts whose goal is to interact with humans and influence
them. Starting from the definition of credulous (i.e., human accounts with a high percent-
age of bot friends among their followees), in this work we aim to single out a regression
model to derive, with an acceptable margin of error, the percentage of bot-followees of a
human-operated account. The advantage lies in knowing, as a preventive measure, which
users may be the target of bots’ activities, hence more exposed to the misleading/unreliable
content. Our results showed that the best regression model achieves a Mean Absolute Er-
ror of 3.62% and a Root Mean Squared Error of 5.96%, thus encouraging further research
in this direction.
keywords – Credulous Twitter Users, Humans-Bots Interactions, Disinformation Spread-
ing, Social Networks Analysis, Supervised Learning
1 Introduction
The widespread use of mobile devices, combined with the ease and cheapness of being connected,
are some of the most important factors increasing the usage of Online Social Media (OSM) as
means of communication [35]. Several studies [11, 34, 3] recently confirmed OSM (such as
Facebook and Twitter) as more pervasive than traditional mass media (e.g., radio, newspaper,
etc.), especially among youngest people [35].
As consequence of the OSM’s pervasiveness, a larger audience is reached, but several issues
arise about the veracity of the circulating news. This leads to fake news and misinformation
that are intentionally propagated for harmful purposes [27]. The information diffusion on
OSM is often supported by automated accounts controlled, totally (bots) or partially (cyborg),
by ad-hoc software applications [45]. Under fictive identity, such automated accounts actively
interact (social bots [18]) with genuine users and share/produce contents of doubtful credibility.
Governments1, academics [50] and OSM administrators2 are struggling to face these problems.
Despite the efforts spent by OSM administrators in removing suspicious accounts34, and
by researchers in improving bot detection techniques [33, 2], this plague is far from being
eradicated. In fact, it has been estimated that, on Twitter, the percentage of bots among
∗Partially supported by the European Unions Horizon 2020 programme (grant agreement No. 830892,
SPARTA) and by IMT Scuola Alti Studi Lucca: Integrated Activity Project TOFFEe TOols for Fighting
FakEs.
1https://tinyurl.com/yym2xa3v
2https://tinyurl.com/yac7lsn6
3Facebook: https://tinyurl.com/y3yzvpah
4Twitter: https://tinyurl.com/y3efs8s5
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the active users ranges between 9% and 15% [45]. Furthermore, a new generation of bots,
more sophisticated than the previous ones, are able to avoid detection by mimicking human
behaviour [14].
In some cases, bots have been used to call volunteers in case of emergencies [40] or to spread
academic events such as conferences, but these are only exceptions. In fact, a dominant use of
these artificial entities is for malicious purposes, e.g., to encourage hate speeches, misconception
and, more in general to influence people [44, 25].
The effectiveness of such malicious activities, intended to manipulate public opinion, has been
investigated on the Brexit referendum [22], the US Presidential election 2016 [8], the elections in
France [17] and Mexico [9]. These are few well-known examples of how and to what extent bots
and disinformation can damage democracy, especially if this kind of campaigns target specific
categories of users.
A recent study stated that the majority of genuine (human) users usually do not check the
reliability of contents on OSM, and many even share these articles [16]; hence contributing,
although unknowingly, to diffuse unreliable content. Moreover, in [26] models for influence
propagation in OSM have been studied, and a strong correlation emerged between the target
nodes (to influence) and the role of their neighbours (social contacts).
Using Twitter as benchmark, this paper focuses on finding a way to determine, as precisely as
possible, the amount of potential malicious accounts (bots) a human is following (bot-followees).
In our opinion, the more bots a user is following, the more she/he is exposed to potentially
malicious activities. Specifically, by using Machine Learning (ML) techniques, we aim to single
out a regression model able to predict, for a human-operated account, the percentage of its
bot-followees. Starting from a publicly available dataset5 of credulous users, built in [7], and
by using commonly employed features from the literature [45, 12], we build several regression
models by means of various ML algorithms. We then use Mean Absolute Error (MAE) and the
Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) for evaluation.
For the sake of completeness, we experiment on two “versions” of the considered dataset:
firstly by considering the subset of credulous users only (with 316 instances, henceforth called
credulous-only), and then on the whole set of human-operated accounts (with 2,838 instances,
named all humans. The experimental results are promising. The best model trained by using
credulous-only, achieves a MAE of 4.32% and a RMSE of 6.62%. On the other hand, astonish-
ingly, the best model trained on the whole humans set, fits better; in fact it obtains a MAE of
3.62% and a RMSE of 5.96%. Although RMSE scores are not the best obtained, by following
the finding in [48], we prefer to give more importance to MAE scores than to RMSE.
Despite these encouraging results, additional efforts are needed to improve users’ awareness.
The usefulness in improving the accuracy of these models is twofold. Firstly, in a preventive
way, to identify sensible users more exposed to the malicious activities of bots and by being
identified as good targets of misinformation campaigns. Secondly, to safeguard the usefulness,
credibility and effectiveness of social media as mean of communication.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow: Section 2 presents the related work;
Section 3 exposes the general approach and provides the details of the performed experiments;
Section 4 illustrates the experimental results; Section 5 discusses the main findings, and Section
6 concludes the paper by outlining future research.
5Dataset: https://tinyurl.com/y4o98c7l
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2 Related Work
This paper aims to investigate the dynamics and causes of human users influenced by Social
Media, especially if interacting with bots and exposed to misinformation. In the following, we
review the related work dealing with similar goals.
Despite this cannot be considered an exhaustive literature review, we tried to supply con-
cepts, definitions and adopted strategies related to interactions between human-operated ac-
counts and bots on Social Media.
In [46] the authors stress the importance of adopting protection mechanisms in Social Media
to protect human-operated accounts. To this purpose, the authors provided the definition of
susceptible users, i.e., users who start to interact with a social bot (even if only once). By
introducing a set of 97 features (categorized in linguistic, network and behavioural), a binary
classifier is successfully produced to spot out susceptible users. A regression model was also built
to predict users level of susceptibility without success. Inspired by the definition of susceptible
users and finding the regression model construction a very challenging goal, in our work we
investigate the usage of a regression model able to predict the percentage of bots followed by a
human-operated account.
On the same line of the described research, in [47] the authors conducted a feature study
to single out those features useful to predict whether a user is likely to interact with a bot. To
this end, the considered users have been contacted by a bot through a tweet mention, and when
replying users are labelled as susceptible. The drawback of this approach is represented by the
key feature (i.e., klout score), no longer available due to the related web-service closure.
In [31] a comprehensive categorization scheme for social bot attacks in Twitter has been
proposed. The analysis of each attack is considered along different dimensions, i.e., targets,
account types, vulnerabilities, attack methods and results. This categorization is useful to in-
vestigate to which class of attacks users with a considerable percentage of bot-followees are
vulnerable. Specifically, the authors observed the impact of social bots in link creation between
targeted human-operated accounts in Twitter.
In [42], inspired by [46], gullible users have been defined in relation to their susceptibility to
fake news. The authors present five degrees of susceptibility (referred to a user’s reply to a fake
news) and, by using the same features of [46], attempt to build a multi-class classifier predicting
the user’s reply susceptibility level. The classifier achieves an AUC of 0.82. Similarly to this
approach, we also used existing feature sets (Botometer [15] and ClassA [12]), but applied to a
regression task.
An interesting case study is presented in [39], where human’s skills have been tested in
recognizing fake accounts generated by the M3 app [29]. In general, there is a good humans’
ability to distinguish the generated accounts, but there are no details on the characteristics
of such fake accounts. Sharing the same motivation, our work is related to the production of
a regression model that, complementary to [39], quantifies when a human user is not able to
recognize a bot.
We conclude this section by mentioning our previous works [6, 7]. Beside the definitions of
susceptible users [46] and gullible users [42], in [6] we introduced the concept of credulous users,
i.e., human operated accounts following a considerable amount of bots (i.e., bot-followees using
Twitter’s slang). A set of rules have been introduced to discern whether a user is a credulous,
and these rules allow to rank human operated accounts by relying on the ratio of bots (supported
by a bot detector) over their followees. On a dataset with more 700 human operated accounts,
only 64 have been identified as credulous6. Here, the drawback is represented by the huge
6First Credulous Dataset: https://tinyurl.com/y6lod2yz
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amount of data needed to investigate the followees of humans under analysis.
To overcome this issue, in [7], we built a binary classifier to find out credulous Twitter users
by considering a larger ground-truth (of almost 3k7) and considering only features of the profile
and not of users’ followees. We ended up with a lightweight (in terms of costs for gathering
the data) classifier. The achieved classification performance have been very promising with an
accuracy of 93.27% and an AUC (Area Under the ROC curve) of 0.93.
Although this work is in line with the themes of the previous ones [6, 7], it differs in scope
and strategy. The primary target is the prediction of a percentage value of bot-followees, and
the adopted strategy is no longer the classification, but the regression.
3 Experimental Setup
This section explains the dataset, the features and the experimental design; specifying the
metrics used to evaluate the performance of the trained models.
3.1 Dataset
The considered dataset includes 2,838 IDs of human-operated accounts on Twitter, presented
in [7] and publicly available8. A label (0 or 1) is associated to each entry to indicate whether
an account is credulous (with 1) or not (with 0).
For each account we downloaded all the information (timeline, tweet mentions and profile data)
of its followees. Then, through of a bot detector [7], it has been possible to assign, to each
followee, a label indicating whether it is a bot. This allows us to derive a ground-truth where
each accounts is assigned to a percentage of its bot-followees. As anticipated in Section 1, two
versions have been built: one including the 316 entries labeled as credulous (credulous-only)
and another one including all 2,838 human-operated accounts (all hums).
All accounts in our dataset belong to human users and are taken from the three publicly
available sources9 briefly described below:
cresci-2015 [12]. This repository consists of three smaller datasets: (i) 469 Twitter accounts
certified as human-operated during in a research project named @TheFakeProject. (ii) 1,481
accounts selected as genuine users as the result of a sociological study relying on manual veri-
fication. (iii) 833 fake accounts, bought from three different Twitter accounts online markets.
cresci-2017 [13]. This repository contains 3,474 Twitter accounts certified as humans and
6,609 social spambots (e.g., spammers of job offers and advertising products on sale at Amazon).
The humans were selected through a hybrid crowd-sensing approach [5]; the authors of [13]
randomly contacted Twitter users and asked simple questions in natural language, all replies
were then manually verified.
varol-2017 [45]. This repository consists of 2,573 Twitter accounts selected after a manual
annotation based on inspecting the profile details and the produced content. Overall, 1,747
Twitter accounts were annotated as human-operated and 826 as bots.
7Dataset: https://tinyurl.com/y4o98c7l
8Dataset: https://tinyurl.com/y4o98c7l
9BotRepository:https://tinyurl.com/yxfxmqac
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3.2 Features
The features employed to represent the human accounts can be grouped in three sets. The first
set inherits the features from the Botometer web service10, plus some additional ones introduced
in [6]. We use the Botometer macro categories scores, which encompasses the essence of all the
features (around 1,000) [15], on which the outputs’ scores are computed. We extend this set
by considering also: the CAP (Completely Automated Profile) value, the “Scores” [49], the
number of tweets and mentions. This augmented set of features will be called Botometer+ in
the rest of the paper.
The second set inherits the so-called ClassA features, singled out in [12]. We discard the one
considering duplicated pictures, because we could not verify whether the picture of a profile was
also used in another one. This subset is called ClassA-. We want to stress that these features
can be extracted by only looking at the social profile of an account, without considering the
timeline, that is instead considered in Botometer+. A schematic representation of these two
feature sets is reported in table 5 in Appendix A.1.
The third set of features has been built through the union of the two previous ones and
called ALL features. We want to remark that these three feature sets have been successfully
used for binary classification task in [7]; and the introduction of new features is out of the scope
of this work.
3.3 Experimental Design
The experimental session starts by setting up the data; precisely, by transforming the entries
of our dataset accordingly to the three sets of features.
Afterwards, to train regression models, 14 algorithms have been employed. The ma-
chine learning framework utilized to conduct the experiments is Weka [21]. Accordingly to
the notation adopted by the tool, the algorithms are: ZeroR11 (used to obtain a baseline
value against which to compare the values of the other model), REPTree [37], LinearRegres-
sion [28], k-Nearest Neighbour (IBk) [1], LWL [4], AdditiveRegression [20], RegressionByDis-
cretization [19], M5Rules [38], DecisionStump [24], GaussianProcess [30], SMOreg [43], Multi-
layerPerceptron [36], MLPRegressor12, RandomForest [10]. To investigate whether regression
models, built on credulous users work better than the general case, we experiment on both
versions (credulous-only and all hums).
Results evaluation At best of our knowledge, there are few papers addressing this prob-
lem [46, 42]. Hence, no well-defined baseline is available from the literature to compare our
results. To overcome this issue, we compare the performance of the trained models (obtained
from the aforementioned algorithms) with the score calculated by ZeroR method, since it pre-
dicts, for each human-operated account, the average value of the population.
To evaluate models’ performance, two metrics have been used: Mean Absolute Error (MAE)
and Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) that are widely used for regression tasks13 [32]. The
former measures the average of errors in a set of numerical predictions, between the real values
and the predicted ones (MAE = 1
n
∑n
j=1 |yrealj − ypredj |); the latter measures the error too,
but it stresses more the prediction error by raising the square of the difference between the real
values and the predicted ones (RMSE =
√
1
n
∑n
j=1 (yrealj − ypredj)
2).
10Botometer web service (RapidAPI): https://tinyurl.com/yytf282s
11ZeroR weka: https://tinyurl.com/y4hdhp54
12MLPRegressor weka: https://tinyurl.com/y5krc6d2
13https://tinyurl.com/yd9ljcmj
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Through the experimental results analyzer embedded in Weka [41], we performed statistical
tests (paired T-Test [23] with α = 0.05) to determine which algorithm performs significantly
better than the baseline, relatively to each set of features.
All the results are presented in the following section 4 and then discussed in section 5.
4 Experimental Results
For sake of clarity, Section 4.1 reports the results referring to the experiments performed on
the set of credulous users only (credulous-only). Section 4.2 shows the outcome derived by
considering all the human-operated accounts (all hums).
Tables 1-4 have the same structure, differing in evaluation metric and ground-truth data
entries. In the first column the algorithms mentioned in Section 3.3 are listed. The remaining
columns show the scores obtained when dataset’s instances are represented according to a
specific feature set (see section 3.2) namely Botometer+, ClassA- and All features. The first
row of the table contains the baseline obtained through the ZeroR method. The star symbol
indicates some tables’ entries whose associated value is significantly lower than the baseline,
according to the paired t-test performed by Weka (see results evaluation in Section 3.3). The
lowest score is reported in bold.
4.1 Credulous-only
Table 1 reports the scores related to the RMSE. The baseline is offered by ZeroR showing a
score equal to 6.73%. Note that in the column headed Botometer+, there are no starred values.
Despite some of them are lower than the baseline (i.e., LinearRegression, M5Rules, Gaussian-
Processes, SMOreg and RandomForest), their values have not been considered significantly
lower by Weka, in fact they are slightly better than the baseline. Among all values, the lowest
one belongs to GaussianProcesses (6.48%) followed by LinearRegression (6.52%).
Algorithms
Feature sets
Botometer+ ClassA- All features
→ ZeroR ← (baseline) 6.73 6.73 6.73
REPTree 6.92 6.86 6.86
LinearRegression 6.52 8.52 8.62
IBk 8.71 8.95 8.02
LWL 6.84 6.10* 6.26
AdditiveRegression 6.79 6.30 6.20
RegressionByDiscretization 8.43 7.47 7.78
M5Rules 6.53 9.20 7.44
DecisionStump 6.90 6.15* 6.15*
GaussianProcesses 6.48 7.34 7.55
SMOreg 6.62 7.70 7.71
MultilayerPerceptron 10.79 11.97 11.82
MLPRegressor 7.59 7.50 6.86
RandomForest 6.60 6.15* 6.21
Table 1: Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) on credulous users
Differently from the Botometer+ case, the column ClassA- there are some starred values.
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Algorithms
Feature sets
Botometer+ ClassA- All features
→ ZeroR ← (baseline) 4.84 4.84 4.84
REPTree 4.91 4.78 4.77
LinearRegression 4.68 5.18 5.19
IBk 5.88 6.17 5.44
LWL 4.83 4.36* 4.40*
AdditiveRegression 4.83 4.55 4.39*
RegressionByDiscretization 5.88 5.22 5.54
M5Rules 4.68 5.18 4.90
DecisionStump 4.83 4.36* 4.36*
GaussianProcesses 4.66 4.90 4.95
SMOreg 4.32* 4.64 4.67
MultilayerPerceptron 6.91 8.17 7.92
MLPRegressor 5.16 5.19 4.78
RandomForest 4.86 4.54 4.44
Table 2: Mean Absolute Error (MAE) on credulous users
Both DecisionStump and RandomForest achieve a RMSE score of 6.15%; but, the lowest value
of 6.10% belongs to LWL, which also is the best score reported in Table 1.
The last column of Table 1 contains only one starred value which also the column’s lowest
score (DecisionStump). Like for the previous column, also here there are some values lower than
the baseline (AdditiveRegression with 6.20% and RandomForest with 6.21%), but not enough
to be labeled as star entries.
Table 2 exposes the scores related to MAE. The indicated baseline is of 4.84%.
Looking at Botometer+ features, the values lower than the baseline are: 4.83% (LWL,
AdditiveRegression, DecisionStump), 4.68% (LinearRegression, M5Rules), 4.66% (Gaussian-
Processes) and 4.32% (SMOreg, starred). The latter is the lowest MAE.
When considering ClassA- features, the values lower than the baseline are: 4.78% (Linear-
Regression), 4.64% (SMOreg), 4.55% (AdditiveRegression), 4.54% (RandomForest) and 4.36%
(DecisionStump and LWL, both starred).
If all features are analyzed, the values lower than the baseline are: 4.78% (MLPRegresso),
4.77% (REPTree), 4.67% (SMOreg), 4.44% (RandomForest), 4.40% (LWL, starred), 4.39%
(AdditiveRegression, starred), 4.36% (DecisionStump, starred).
4.2 All humans
In this Section we report the results related to the experiments performed on all human-operated
accounts (2,838 instances).
Table 3 reports the values concerning RMSE, with a baseline value of 6.25%.
In the second column (Botometer+), almost all the RMSE scores are lower than the baseline
and starred, with the exception of IBk (7.73%), RegressionByDiscretization (6.32%) and Mul-
tilayerPerceptron (7.67%). With a score of 5.77%, LinearRegression has the lowest column’s
RMSE (and the second better one in Table 3). Concerning the third column (ClassA-), the
situation is slightly worse. Despite nine values have better scores than the baseline, only three
of them are significantly lower: 6.02% (REPTree, the lowest) and 6.06% (DecisionStump and
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Algorithms
Feature sets
Botometer+ ClassA- All features
→ ZeroR ← (baseline) 6.25 6.25 6.25
REPTree 5.96* 6.02* 5.93*
LinearRegression 5.77* 6.14 5.80*
IBk 7.73 8.58 7.59
LWL 5.91* 6.08 5.99*
AdditiveRegression 5.84* 6.07 5.80*
RegressionByDiscretization 6.32 6.43 6.83
M5Rules 6.02* 6.16 5.84*
DecisionStump 5.96* 6.06* 6.02*
GaussianProcesses 5.79* 6.13 5.83*
SMOreg 5.91* 6.36 5.96*
MultilayerPerceptron 7.67 6.53 9.47
MLPRegressor 5.89* 6.06* 6.84
RandomForest 5.92* 6.09 5.72*
Table 3: Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) on all the human-operated accounts
MLPRergessor both). The forth column (ClassA-) shows a situation close to Botometer+’s
case. In fact, with exception of four cases (i.e., IBk, RegressionByDiscretization, MultilayerPer-
ceptron and MLPRegressor), all the other entries have significantly better values w.r.t. baseline
(starred table’s entries). The lowest RMSE of 5.72% is achieved by using RandomForest and
it is the better score of Table 3.
Finally, Table 4 presents the MAE outcome. The calculated baseline is 4.21%. At first
Algorithms
Feature sets
Botometer+ ClassA- All features
→ ZeroR ← (baseline) 4.21 4.21 4.21
REPTree 3.95* 3.94* 3.87*
LinearRegression 3.84* 4.08 3.83*
IBk 5.07 5.43 4.95
LWL 3.97* 4.00* 3.98*
AdditiveRegression 3.89* 3.93* 3.76*
RegressionByDiscretization 4.16 4.24 4.36
M5Rules 3.91* 3.96* 3.82*
DecisionStump 4.06 3.99* 4.07
GaussianProcesses 3.87* 4.09 3.87*
SMOreg 3.67* 3.84* 3.62*
MultilayerPerceptron 4.90 4.39 5.14
MLPRegressor 3.88* 3.93* 4.07
RandomForest 3.96* 3.96* 3.77*
Table 4: Mean Absolute Error (MAE) on all the human-operated accounts
sight, regardless to the feature sets, almost all the entries are lower than baseline; and most of
them are starred. When considering Botometer+ features, the exceptions are: IBk (5.07%) and
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MultilayerPerceptron (4.90%); RegressionByDiscretization (4.16%) and DecisionStump (4.06%)
are not lower enough to gain the star. For Botometer+, the lowest MAE is 3.67% (the second
better value) achieved by the model built by mean of SMOreg.
Similarly, when analyzing ClassA- features, the values higher than the baseline are: 5.43%
(IBk), 4.24% (RegressionByDiscretization) and 4.39% (MultilayerPerceptron). The remaining
values are significantly lower than the one in the ZeroR’s row but 4.08% (LinearRegression) and
4.09% (GaussianProcesses). Even in this case, the lowest score (3.84%) belongs to SMOreg.
Like in the previous cases, even when all features are taken into account, almost all values
are lower, not only compared to the baseline, but also compared (by row) to the values of the
other two feature sets. The values overcoming the baseline are: 5.14% (MultilayerPerceptron),
4.95% (IBk) and 4.36% (RegressionByDiscretization). Except MLPRegressor and DecisionS-
tump (both 4.07%), all the other entries have significantly better MAE values (starred). Once
again, SMOreg outperforms other algorithms’ scores for all features, with a MAE of 3.62%; the
lowest in Table 4.
5 Discussion
It is possible to immediately notice that better results can be obtained when the full version of
the dataset (all hums) is considered rather than credulous-only, in terms of both quantity (num-
ber of models with lower performance than the baseline) and quality (statistical significance of
the values).
However, focusing on baseline values of each metric, the highest ones are observed in the
version credulous-only. This is due to a higher distance between the real values (by credulous
class attribute) and the average value calculated on them. The fact that all hums ’s baselines
have lower values indicates a better closeness to the average value of not-credulous instances.
Considering the MAE metric, the model generated by the SMOreg algorithm is the most
accurate, regardless of the dataset versions. This concordance is limited exclusively to the
algorithm, as these performances have been obtained with two different feature sets: 4.32%
by using Botometer+ for credulous-only version and 3.62% with All features for the All hums
version.
But, considering the dataset with all instances, and looking the MAE’s score obtained by
SMOreg (using Botometer+’s features), we can see that the value is very similar (3,67%, the
second-best result). This 0,05% loss (3,62 vs 3,67) can still be overshadowed by the advantage
of not having to calculate the ClassA- features (included in ALL features). Therefore, at least
as far as MAE metrics are concerned, a representation in Botometer+ features combined with
the use of the SMOreg algorithm can be considered the best choice.
Good performances are also achieved by the algorithms LWL and RandomForest, producing
the models with the best RMSE in credulous-only and all hums, respectively. DecisionStump
and AdditiveRegression produce good models too, and many times even with errors significantly
lower than the baseline. As for the models generated through REPTree, LinearRegression,
M5Rules, GaussianProcesses andMLPRegressor, it is possible to notice an inequality depending
on the version of the dataset to which they are applied, proving more effective when used on the
full version. Unfortunately, the use of IBk RegressionByDiscetization and MultilayerPerceptron
has not been profitable, regardless of both the set of used features and the version of the
considered dataset.
In some cases, on the same algorithm, the score obtained by using All features is identical (or
very similar) to the one in ClassA- or Botometer+. These situations occur when the algorithm
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prefers to consider the components of a certain feature set. Some examples are given by:
DecisionStump in Tables 2 and 1, GaussianProcesses in Table 4 and REPTree in Table 1.
Further findings can be provided by studying, for each evaluation metric, to what extent
the choice of a feature set (w.r.t. another one) can affect the overall performance. Regardless
of the cost to calculate a feature set, the experimental results do not show a great disparity
in preferring one feature set over another. Therefore, as far as the ”MAE” is concerned, the
previous assertion of preferring the Botometer+ functionalities remains valid.
On the contrary, considering RMSE, the situation is more complicated. The best values come
from the use of two distinct feature sets: ClasseA- (credulous-only) and All features (all hums).
By using a similar logic adopted for the MAE, it is possible to notice that, the second-best RMSE
value for credulous-only is identical both for ClassA- and All features. Therefore, unlike MAE
case, if we concern about the RMSE only, we can prefer All features, making the calculus of
ClassA-’s features mandatory.
6 Conclusion
The recent literature shows a great deal of concern regarding the effectiveness of malicious bots
and in their role to affect several domains (economics, politics, etc.). Not only as regards the
spreading of fake news, but especially on their ability to interact with and deceive human users.
In fact, the dissemination of low-credibility content is not only performed by social bots but
also emphasized by genuine users by sharing it [16].
In this work, we devote our attention to single out a method that enables us to quantify,
as precisely as possible, the percentage of bots followed (bot-followees) by human operated
accounts in Twitter. By mean of machine learning regression techniques, we derived predictive
models. The experimentation has been conducted firstly by considering credulous users only
(i.e., humans with high percentage of bots among their friends) and then on all the human-
operated accounts in the dataset.
For our experimentation we considered three feature sets, namely: Botometer+, ClassA- and
their union All features. We recall that Botometer+’s features are obtained by using the related
web-service, and for each user the following input is required: profile data, tweets, mention-
tweets. The calculus of ClassA-’s features is less expensive because such features are derived by
analyzing users’ data profile only. The best regression model, obtained on the complete dataset
trained with the SMOreg algorithm, achieves promising performances, in fact it shows a Mean
Absolute Error of 3.62% by using the feature set All features and 3.67% with Botometer+’s
features.
We think that having an estimate of how many bots a human account follows, can be a first
step to the fact-checking of what people reads on their dashboards and from whom they are
reading. Additionally, such approaches can help researchers and social media administrators to
(i) identify potential targets of misinformation campaigns in advance and (ii) contributing to
increase the usefulness, credibility and effectiveness of social media.
Further efforts have to be devoted to this research topic; as future work it can be interesting
to focus on the nature and quality of the information that humans with a large percentage of
bot-followees create and/or contribute to diffuse.
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A Appendix
A.1 Feature sets
Name Original Features Features alteration
Botometer+
used in[7]
From Botometer[45]
Macro categories scores:
Sentiment, Friend,
User, Content,
Temporal, Net
(+) CAP (ENG and UNI)
(+) Score (ENG and UNI)
(+) #Tweets4WS
(+) #Mentions4WS
ClassA-
used in[7]
From Fake Follower[12]
(Class A)
friends/(followers2), age,
#tweets, profile has name,
has URL in profile, following rate,
default image after 2 months,
belongs to a list, profile has image,
friends/followers≥50,
‘bot’ in biography, #friends,
2× followers ≥ friends,
#followers, friends/followers≃100,
no bio & no location & friends≥100,
has address, has biography
(-) duplicated pictures
of the profile
Table 5: Feature sets
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